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Abstract
Th e article aims to present a new interpretation of Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski’s 
De vanitate consiliorum by discussing the way the Latin notion of prudentia and the 
two-fold argument (disputatio in utramque partem) are employed in the dialogue.
Th e fi rst part of the article briefl y discusses the origin and meanings of prudentia as 
it was employed in the Ciceronian tradition. Th e notion of prudence as practical judge-
ment in relation to aff airs of state is linked here to the Ciceronian mode of arguing in 
utramque partem, allowing a careful examination of diff erent aspects of any given issue 
before taking political action.
Th e second part of the article outlines the ways the notion of prudence is used 
throughout De vanitate consiliorum. Prudentia is referred to by the characters of the 
dialogue as a faculty that allows the statesman to make the best of contradictory forces 
infl uencing the course of political aff airs – a faculty which does not ensure success, but 
allows one to achieve the best possible result in the contingent sphere of human aff airs.
Th e third and fi nal part of the article discusses the two ways the image of ‘two-
headed prudence’ is invoked in De vanitate consiliorum, either in reference to the pru-
dent judgement which carefully examines diff erent aspects of the issue at hand or to 
the council’s indecisiveness which hinders the possibility of consensus necessary to take 
political action. An interpretation of the dialogue as a rhetorical exercise in prudence is 
proposed in this part, arguing that the way Lubomirski employs rhetorical deliberation 
in utramque partem invites the reader to constantly exercise his own practical judge-
ment in relation to aff airs of state.
Key words: Prudence, Early Modern rhetoric, Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski, argu-
ing in utramque partem
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De vanitate consiliorum, a Neo-Latin dialogue of 1700 by Stanisław Herak-
liusz Lubomirski (1642–1702) is a perplexing work – as is testifi ed by the 
discrepancies between the diff erent interpretations of it which have been 
put forward over the years. Th e dialogue, consisting of twenty-fi ve brief 
inquiries (‘Consultationes’), in which Vanity and Truth discuss numerous 
issues concerning legislation and policy-making in the Commonwealth, 
has been described as: a socio-technical treatise;1 a pessimistic diagnosis of 
the condition of 17th-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth;2 a com-
mentary on techniques of making correct political decisions;3 a political 
pamphlet aimed at Augustus II the Strong;4 a skeptical treatise on the art 
of rulership;5 and a dialogue about an “Upside-Down World.”6
All of these descriptions stem from a single shared premise: that the 
key to understanding Lubomirski’s dialogue lies in fi guring out the re-
lationship between, on the one hand, the characters of the dialogue and 
the subjects which they discussed, and, on the other, the political reality 
of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the turn of the 17th century.7 
While this approach produced some genuine insights, it led most scholars 
(with the notable exceptions of Adam Karpiński and Paulina Buchwald-
Pelcowa) to overlook issues related to the rhetorical structure of De vani-
tate consiliorum.
1  B. Chodźko, Pisma polityczne marszałka Lubomirskiego w perspektywie 
uniwersalistycznej refl eksji etycznej i prakseologicznej, Białystok 1998, p. 83.
2  G. Raubo, Barokowy świat człowieka. Refl eksja antropologiczna w twórczości 
Stanisława Herakliusza Lubomirskiego, Poznań 1997, p. 94.
3  M. Mejor, Stanislaus Heraclius Lubomirius – nobilis Polonus, scriptor Latinus. Uwagi 
o latinitas Lubomirskiego, [in:] Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski – twórca i dzieła, eds. 
A. Karpiński, E. Lasocińska, Warszawa 2004, p. 66.
4  J. Staszewski, Pomysły reformatorskie czasów Augusta II. Uwagi o dziełach 
i programach, “Kwartalnik Historyczny” 82 (1975), no. 4, pp. 737–740.
5  Cz. Hernas, Barok, Warszawa 1976, pp. 534–535; A. Karpiński, S.H. Lubomirski –
moralista i polityk końca XVII w., [in:] Świt i zmierzch baroku, eds. M. Hanusiewicz, 
J. Dąbkowska, A. Karpiński, Lublin 2002, p. 279.
6  P. Buchwald-Pelcowa, Świat odwrócony Stanisława Herakliusza Lubomirskiego, [in:] 
Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski. Pisarz – polityk – mecenas, Wrocław 1982, pp. 137–156.
7  Paulina Buchwald-Pelcowa makes some interesting remarks on how the 
connection between De vanitate consiliorum and the situation of Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth was perceived in the 18th century. Cf. P. Buchwald-Pelcowa, Z dziejów 
recepcji “De vanitate consiliorum” Stanisława Herakliusza Lubomirskiego w wieku XVIII, [in:] 
eadem Historia literatury i historia książki. Studia nad książką i literaturą od średniowiecza 
po wiek XVIII, Kraków 2005, pp. 493–494.
2-łamanie.indd   306 2015-12-21   11:16:03
307Th e Rhetoric of Prudence in Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski’s... 
I would like to argue that the rhetorical structure of Lubomirski’s dia-
logue should not only be taken into consideration, but that, in fact, it is 
the very means of persuasion, deliberation and practical judgment which 
should be regarded as the focal point of De vanitate consiliorum.
Th is article focuses on one facet of the dialogue’s rhetorical structure: 
the way the notion of prudence or practical reason (prudentia) is employed 
in De vanitate consiliorum and the manner in which it relates to Lubomir-
ski’s use of the rhetorical technique of arguing on both sides of a question 
(disputatio in utramque partem).
In the fi rst part of the article, I briefl y outline the way the notion of 
prudentia was understood in the rhetorical tradition stemming from the 
works of Cicero. In the second part, I analyze the meanings associated 
with the notion of prudence by Lubomirski and suggest certain similarities 
between his use of the term and the ones that can be found in the works of 
some other early modern authors. In the third and fi nal part, I discuss the 
relationship between the notion of prudentia and the rhetorical structure 
of De vanitate consiliorum and off er a new interpretation of the dialogue, 
using Victoria Kahn’s concept of rhetoric as a form of prudence.
Prudence and Rhetoric
Th e way that the Latin notion of prudentia was employed in the early 
modern period is far too large a topic to be discussed here. Nevertheless, 
there are certain issues concerning the origin and meanings of the term 
that any commentary on use of prudentia in a Neo-Latin work should take 
into account.
Even though the notion of practical judgment (phronesis) and its con-
nection to rhetoric was already discussed in the Greek rhetorical tradi-
tion by Aristotle,8 it was Cicero’s De oratore that provided the outline of 
prudentia as a philosophical concept9 and established a direct relationship 
8  On Aristotle’s notion of phronesis in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric, see 
L.S. Se l f, “Rhetoric and Phronesis: Th e Aristotelian Ideal,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 12, 
no. 12 (Spring, 1979), pp. 130–145.
9  R.W. Cape, Jr., Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice in Rome, [in:] 
Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice, ed. R. Har iman, University Park 2003,
p. 37.
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between the virtue of prudence (prudentia) and a specifi c rhetorical prac-
tice – that of arguing on both sides of the question (disputatio in utramque 
partem).
Prudentia, which is at the core of Cicero’s ideal of the training and expe-
rience of a rhetorician, is the faculty that provides the orator with the ability 
to determine and deliver the best argument, using the most eff ective mode 
of persuasion, in any given situation. Rooted in the orator’s experience, it 
lacks the unswerving certainty of theoretical knowledge (sapientia), and is 
not concerned with what is universally right, but instead enables him to 
choose the best course of action in the contingent sphere of human aff airs.10 
If we accept Arthur Quinn’s remark that the characteristic “color” of the 
Ciceronian rhetoric would be that of a “skeptical pragmatism,”11 then we 
can fi nd no better expression for this attitude than the notion of prudentia: 
a faculty of practical judgment bridging the gap between the incertitude 
concerning the right course of action and the necessity to act.
But how does Ciceronian orator come to decide on a particular man-
ner of conduct, despite his lack of absolute certainty regarding its results? 
He does so by means of rhetorical deliberation in utramque partem, juxta-
posing contrasting claims against each other and carefully estimating their 
value in a given situation. Th e orator can employ disputatio in utramque 
partem either as a tool of inventio, disregarding the claims contrary to his 
own in the actual speech, or he may use it as part of dispositio, presenting 
the contradicting opinions in his work,12 as Cicero did in his own dia-
logues.13 Whichever of these two approaches is taken, the use of disputatio 
in utramque partem and the exercise of practical judgment strongly ac-
centuate what Heinrich Lausberg has called the “agonistic” or “dialectical” 
10  R. Har iman, Th eory Without Modernity, [in:] Prudence: Classical Virtue, 
pp. 5–6.
11  A. Quinn, Th e Color of Rhetoric, [in:] Rhetorik zwischen den Wissenschaften, ed. 
G. Ueding, Tübingen 1991, p. 138. See also T.O. Sloane, On the Contrary: Th e Protocol 
of Traditional Rhetoric, Washington, DC 1997, p. 88.
12  On the use of so-called “one-sided” and “two-sided” arguments as means of 
persuasion and on the relationship between the modern notion of “two-sided argument” and 
disputatio in utramque partem or dissoi logoi, see D.J. O’Keefe, Persuasion, [in:] Encyclopedia 
of Rhetoric, ed. T.O. Sloane, New York 2001, pp. 575–583.
13  R.W. Cape, op.cit., p. 43, emphasizes the connection between prudentia, disputatio 
in utramque partem and the genre of the dialogue, in which interlocutors employ witty 
banter and irony in presenting their contradicting claims. 
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character of rhetoric:14 the orator’s duty is not merely to propose a certain 
course of action but also to argue a contentious issue and “win over” either 
a hypothetical or an actual opponent.15 Th is connection between the Latin 
notion of prudentia and the rhetorical disputatio in utramque partem was 
widely recognized in the early modern period and disseminated by the 
iconography of “two-headed prudence.”16
Aspects of prudentia discussed in De vanitate consiliorum
Perhaps the most helpful passage for understanding Lubomirski’s use of 
prudentia is found in the third ‘Consultatio’ of De vanitate consiliorum: 
‘De discordiis civilibus, et unione animorum’ (On Discord Between Citi-
zens, and on Unanimity). While Vanitas expresses concern about the dis-
sent among citizens of the Commonwealth, Veritas advises her to embrace 
it and, instead of leading people towards consensus, make use of interne-
cine antagonisms. Not only can the discord be considered useful (as long 
as the mischievous fi ght among themselves, the Commonwealth is safe), 
but according to Veritas, it should be viewed as the guiding principle of 
the world,
Discordia elementorum, mundi vitaeque est harmonia. Tunc plane interire 
mundum necesse erit, cum ad aequalem quietem omnia devenerint. (III, 2)
[Discord is the harmony of elements, the world and life. If everything came to 
a uniform peace, then clearly the world would have to perish.]
14  See H. Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, transl. M.T. Bl i s s, A. Janssen, 
D.E. S., eds. D.E. Orton, R. Dean Anderson, Leiden 1998, s. 63.
15  It can be argued that this approach inverts the relationship between rhetoric 
and probability: it is not because certain issues are dubious that we argue for or against 
them, but rather by arguing for or against them those very issues are put into doubt. See 
Ch. Pere lman, Imperium retoryki. Retoryka i argumentacja, transl. M. Chomiszcz, 
ed. R. Kleszcz, Warszawa 2004, p. 157: “to argue on behalf of a certain thesis is to point 
out that it is not evident and obvious to everyone. If one needs to prove the existence of 
God, then it means that his existence is no longer unquestionable.” 
16  See V. Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance, Ithaca–London 
1985, passim. On the iconology of ‘two-headed Prudentia’ and its relationship to rhetorical 
controversia, see T.O. Sloane, Donne, Milton, and the End of Humanist Rhetoric, Berkeley 
1985, pp. 57–63.
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Th e statesman’s duty is, therefore, not simply to pacify the strife among 
the people of the Commonwealth, but to fi nd an appropriate means of 
using those very internal tensions for the advantage of his own goals and 
those of the state. Th is emerges from the following passage, in which the 
classic topos of the Ship of the State is employed,
Non minus damnosa est navigatori nimia malacia, quam tempestas. Non pro-
greditur navis sine ventis, sed g u b e r n a t o r i s  p r u d e n t i a  novit ex ven-
torum varietate vela moderari.” (III, 2)17
[Th e calm sea is no less harmful to the sailor than the tempest. Th e ship will not 
move forward without the winds, but it is the p r u d e n c e  o f  t h e  h e l m s -
m a n  which knows how to move the sails in accordance with the winds.]
Th e prudentia of the helmsman (or the statesman) is therefore a faculty 
which allows him to make the best out of contradictory forces infl uenc-
ing the course of political aff airs. His task is not to steer the Ship of State, 
but to let it be driven in a certain way – not to strike, but to roll with the 
punches,18 as Veritas says in a later passage, in which the Ship of the State 
metaphor is employed once again,
Ubi vidisti Nautam sapientem ad unum semper ventum vela vertere? Tem-
pestati parendum est, non resistendum, nisi velis rem constantissime perdere. 
(VII, 8)19
17  S.H. Lubomirski, De vanitate consiliorum liber unus, Warszawa 1700. Th e Roman 
numeral indicates the ‘Consultatio’, and the Arabic, the point of discussion, as marked in 
this edition.
18  A similar metaphor for the way the vir prudens conducts himself in the world of 
politics is employed in the second book of Cicero’s De re publica. In his discussion with 
Laelius, Scipio compares a politician possessing the virtue of prudentia to an elephant driver 
who is able to steer the massive animal merely by means of a “gentle touch,”
sed tamen est ille prudens, qui, ut saepe in Africa vidimus, immani et vastae 
insidens beluae, coercet et regit [beluam] quocumque volt et levi admonitu aut 
tactu infl ectit illam feram. (II 67)
[For he is the prudent one who, as we have often seen in Africa, sitting upon the 
enormous beast, controls it as he wishes and manages the beast by means of light 
admonition and gentle touch.]
19  In this passage sapiens is used in the same way that prudens was employed in the 
‘Consultatio Prima’. While Lubomirski seems to be fairly consistent in his use of prudentia, 
he was not very strict about diff erentiating between prudentia and sapientia.
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[Where have you ever seen a wise sailor who always tries to catch only one 
wind in his sails? You must surrender to the tempest, not resist it, if you do not 
want to lose the cause on account of your infl exibility.]
I deliberately began my analysis with the third ‘Consultatio’ in De 
vanitate consiliorum, even though the remarks concerning prudence and 
its relationship to choosing from among a number of contradictory opin-
ions already appear in the fi rst one. I did so because the propositions put 
forward in the fi rst and third ‘Consultationes’ seem to contradict each 
other; and it is much easier to explain the way Lubomirski makes use of 
these contradictions if we reverse the order in which these two parts of the 
dialogue are considered.
After several propositions concerning the summoning of the Coun-
cil are dismissed by Veritas in the fi rst Consultatio, Vanitas states that she 
wants to select the most prudent men as her advisors,
VAN. In arduis et diffi  cilimis rebus requiram multos, et quidem prudentis-
simos consiliarios.
VER. Require potius duos tantum, et simplicissimos; occasionem et neces-
sitatem. Brevissima tibi dicent, et facillime, et quidem plura ac utiliora; quam 
strepitus multorum sermonum, inter se diu dissidentium. (I, 8)
[VAN: For the troublesome and diffi  cult issues, I will summon many truly 
prudent advisors.
VER: Preferably summon only two and the simplest ones: the occasion and 
the necessity. Th ey will speak to you freely and in brief, yet saying more and 
more useful things than the din of many speeches contradicting each other.]
Not only is the advice of the prudentissimi consiliari dismissed as less 
useful than that of “the occasion and the necessity,” but internal discord 
is no longer something to be embraced and employed for the statesman’s 
purposes. Why is this so?
Th e fi rst part of the answer is quite simple. If the two guiding princi-
ples the statesman should be aware of are the opportune moment (occasio) 
and the necessity of action (necessitas), then what he needs to possess is, 
in fact, prudentia: the faculty of practical judgment, rooted in his experi-
ence and allowing him to make necessary decisions even without absolute 
certainty. If the same faculty were to be shared by many diff erent advisors 
selected by the statesman, their perceptions of what could be done and 
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what was necessary to do might diff er so much that it would render him 
unable to act.
Th e second part of the answer is a somewhat more nuanced. It is the 
apparent contradictions themselves which testify to the statesman’s use of 
prudential judgment. Th e ability to modify or disregard certain rules of 
conduct, if they run the risk of preventing one from taking some necessary 
action, is an essential characteristic of prudentia. A vir prudens may either 
make use of the internal confl icts in the Commonwealth or he may try to 
evade them, if need be, guiding himself in both cases by the principles of 
prudentia. He may also, however, disregard the prudential judgment of 
others if that is what the situation calls for. It is for this reason that the 
advice concerning the ‘proper adjustment of the sails’ is undermined in the 
tenth ‘Consultatio’, where the issue of the occasion for action arises once 
again. While discussing how to choose the right moment to declare war on 
the Commonwealth’s neighbors, Veritas states,
Occasio ut ventus; ventus est occasio navigandi, sed saepe deserit alto mari, 
& qui plenis velis inchoavit, non semel fallaci stetit in anchora. Tu vero re-
mis naviga, occasionem tibi dent vires tuae, non alienae. Et sic fortunam non 
captabis, sed parabis. (X, 3)
[An occasion is like the wind. Th e wind is an occasion for sailing, but often 
it deserts us in the middle of the sea; and the one who started out with all 
sails set has often ended up anchored in the wrong place. Propel your vessel, 
instead, with the oars, so the occasion will come from your own strength and 
not that of others. And, in this way, you will not be seeking luck, but making 
it yourself.]
Clearly, if the rules for prudent statesmanship do not anticipate a situ-
ation in which the statesman fi nds himself, it is prudent for him to over-
throw those rules in order to accommodate changing circumstances.
While Lubomirski’s gubernator prudens is able to adapt to changing 
circumstances in the contingent world of human aff airs (as the metaphor 
of adjusting the sails illustrates), prudentia is not a sure means of attaining 
success in this sphere. For example, a prudent lawmaker may pass a law 
that could be used for mischievous purposes,
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saepe etiam constitutiones, quas prudentissimi virorum in orbe terrarium cir-
cumspectissime conscripserunt, et quae visa sunt summe necessaria, in per-
niciem rerumpublicarum versa sunt. (XIII, 10)
[Often regulations which were written by the most prudent men in the world 
and which appeared to be supremely necessary, have been turned around to 
become the ruin of commonwealths.]
It is worth noting how the relationship between prudence and neces-
sity – which was briefl y touched on earlier – is established in this quota-
tion from Veritas. While it is the statesman’s duty to take political action 
(introduce laws, form policies, and so on), his decisions do not rely on 
certain knowledge, but rather on his experience and his faculty of practical 
judgement. Th erefore even viri prudentissimi can introduce laws which, 
at a given time, “appeared to be necessary” (“visa sunt necessaria”) for the 
well-being of the state, but which are not necessari ly right or in them-
selves. Accordingly, due to changing external circumstances, they can be 
used for purposes which were never intended by the original legislators.
Th e same is true with regard to Veritas’ remarks on the art of warfare. 
Prudence does not guarantee victory in war, since the prudent military 
leader, according to Veritas, can be no surer about the outcome of his plans 
than theologians can be about their speculations,
VER: Habeo et offi  ciales generalesque, peritissimos belli duces.
VAN: Bellum nemo unquam satis didicit. Habes ex illis et imperitissimos for-
tunae tuae aleatores, quandoque liberalissimos praeliorum amissores, et quan-
doque parcissimos armorum conservatores: utrosque tamen prudentissimos et 
innocentissimos bonorum malorumq[ue]; belli authores, & quorum sors cum 
Th eologis convenit: quia cum bene et prudenter agant, nunquam tamen scire 
possunt, an odio vel amore fortunae digni sint. (XVIII, 9)
[VAN: I have offi  cers and generals who are very skilled in warfare.
VER: No one has ever learned enough about war. You have among them the 
dice players, ignorant of your fortune, at times careless in dealing with the 
lives of their troops, at times very sparing in preserving arms. Both these types 
are the most prudent and the most innocent perpetrators of what is right and 
what is wrong, and the fate of those who write about war is like that of theo-
logians: even if they act in a right and prudent way, they can never know for 
sure whether they deserve Fortune’s hatred or love.]
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Veritas maintains that the outcome of military actions does not rely 
solely on the skill of the generals: events are always infl uenced by fortune 
and therefore cannot be predicted with certainty even by the most prudent 
of men. It is telling how Lubomirski in this passage diff erentiates between 
two synonymous Latin terms, fortuna and sors, both of which can be used 
to denote “fate,” “destiny” or “chance.” While viri prudentissimi can know 
their sors (that is, they can have awareness that their knowledge of the 
outcome of their actions is fated to be uncertain), their fortuna (the actual 
result of those actions and the way they infl uence their lives) remains hid-
den from them. Th ings can turn out for the good or the bad; but in his 
dealings with fortune, the prudent military leader is no more certain about 
his prospects for success or failure than if he were a gambler (aleator). Yet 
this relationship between prudentia and fortuna is somewhat paradoxical, 
similar to the way it is treated by Giovanni Pontano (1429–1503) in his 
De fortuna and De prudentia: fortune makes the course of even the most 
prudent actions unpredictable; but if it were not for fortune’s unpredict-
ability, there would be no need to act prudently. As Victoria Kahn has 
remarked in relation to Pontano’s treatises,
it is precisely because fortune is inconsistent and unpredictable, precisely be-
cause we are ignorant of it, that there is both the room and the need for the 
exercise of prudence. Because everything is not causally determined by natural 
law or fate, there is room for the causality of free will, or for the persuasions 
of rhetoric.20
Th e fi nal part of the statement by Veritas quoted above is a paraphrase 
of a passage from the Book of Ecclesiastes in the Vulgate,
Sunt justi atque sapientes, et opera eorum in manu Dei; et tamen nescit homo 
utrum amore an odio dignus sit. (Ecclesiastes 9: 1)
[Th ere are just men and wise men, and their works are in the hand of God: and 
yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love, or hatred.]
Not only does the introduction of this paraphrase reinforce the parallel 
between the theologian and the military leader, introduced by Lubomirski, 
but it also emphasizes the notion of prudentia as the faculty concerned 
20  V. Kahn, op.cit., p. 71.
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with taking action in the contingent sphere of human aff airs. It is no 
longer a question of what intrinsic qualities men possess (‘sunt justi atque 
sapientes’), but how they act in a particular situation (‘bene et prudenter 
agant’). Yet this subtle semantic displacement is undermined as soon as it 
is recognized: for if it is the prudent course of action, and not the virtues 
of character, that matters, why then do the eff ects of one’s decisions remain 
uncertain? Veritas has already explicitly answered this question, however: 
prudence cannot guarantee or assure us that we will attain the desired 
outcome of our actions.
When discussing the uncertainty of prudential judgments in De vani-
tate consiliorum, it should be pointed out that there is a fl ip side to that 
coin. While prudentia allows the statesman to take actions, despite any 
doubts he might have about their outcome, it is also repeatedly presented 
in the dialogue as an ability to withhold or delay action. In the twelfth 
‘Consultatio’, when explaining how laws proposed by the statesman’s op-
ponents should be dealt with, Veritas links prudentia directly with the vir-
tue of patience,
Prius enim opus est ut pateant obstacula, quam amoveantur. Prius investitga-
tur omne arduum, quam superatur. Nihilque vicit unquam prudentia, quod 
prius patientia non cognovit. (XII, 3)
[It is necessary to make obstacles visible before removing them. Every dif-
fi culty has to be investigated before it is overcome. Nothing was ever won by 
prudence which was not previously investigated with patience.]
A similar remark occurs in the twenty-fi rst ‘Consultatio’, in which the 
interlocutors discuss what conditions are favorable for taking military ac-
tion,
Prudentissimi ducum saepissime elegerunt magis credere securitati suae, quam 
fortunae. Temerarios quosque magis puduit solvere obsidionem, quam perdere 
exercitum. Semper compensari potest, quod distulit prudentia, sed rarissime, 
quod abstulit calamitas. (XXI, 8)
[Th e most prudent leaders very often choose to trust their own self-assurance 
rather than fortune. It is the characteristic of reckless men to be more ashamed 
of withdrawing a siege than of losing their army. One can always make up for 
what prudence has delayed, but only rarely for what defeat has taken away.]
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According to a modern pundit, if ‘prudence’ is ever referred to in con-
temporary public discourse, it becomes an excuse for inaction or for ex-
cessively conservative politics;21 but such connotations are not necessarily 
absent from early modern uses of the term. For example, the inscription 
in Titian’s Allegory of Prudence, perhaps the best-known sixteenth-century 
representation of prudentia, reads, “EX PRAETERITO/PRAESENS PRU-
DENTER AGIT/NE FUTURA ACTIONE DETURPET.” Th e use of ne-
gation and of the subjunctive mode here make this sentence strikingly 
similar to the remarks of Lubomirski discussed above: the prudent course 
of action in the present is not so much that which allows for certain actions 
in the future as that which tries not to spoil them.22
While the various aspects of prudentia which have been examined above 
point to signifi cant similarities between Lubomirski’s use of this term and 
its employment in the tradition of Ciceronian rhetoric, it may seem that 
none of the passages which I have quoted up to this point corroborate 
the strong connection between prudence and rhetorical persuasion which 
I have suggested at the beginning of the article. Th ere are, however, at 
least two places in De vanitate consiliorum, both in the fi fth ‘Consultatio’, 
where a direct like between rhetoric and prudence is established. In the 
fi rst of these, Vanitas states that she will “send a most prudent man and 
an eloquent orator” (‘mittam virum prudentem, et eloquentem oratorem;’ 
V, 3) as her envoy to negotiate with the hostile neighbors of the Common-
wealth; after which, the following exchange ensues,
V. VAN. Sed multa prudentia et dexteritate sua persuadebit, et negotia perfi ciet.
VER. Sat tum temporis prudens erit, si ante infectas res tempestive redierit. At 
si prudentiam eius ex multitudine literarum mensurabis, tu imprudens, ille felix, 
quod nihil agendo plura tibi, quam illi, ad quem missus est, persuadebit. (V, 5)
21  R. Har iman, op.cit., p. 14, “Prudence is rarely referred to or honored explicitly 
in contemporary discourse. Periodically, political elites will refer to it when having to 
rationalize inaction. (Th is usage was captured perfectly by the comedian Dana Carvey, 
who satirized President Bush père by wagging his fi nger and saying, ‘Wouldn’t be prudent. 
Wouldn’t be prudent.’).” 
22  In the fourteenth ‘Consultatio’, the fi gure of Janus, who is aware of things both past 
and future, is mentioned by Veritas, “facilius est res nondum actas formare; quam transactas 
reformare. Vellem te in hoc desiderio Iani facies habere, ut tangendo praeterita, respicias 
futura.” [It is easier to shape things which are not yet done than to reshape those which are 
already done. I would like you to have a Janus face in this desire of yours, so that, while 
touching on past things, you gaze at future ones.]
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[VAN: But he will be very persuasive by means of his prudence and skill, and 
he will accomplish many tasks.
VER: He will be prudent with regard to time if he returns at an opportune 
moment, before spoiling the deed.23 And if you measure his prudence from 
the number of letters, you will be imprudent, and he will be happy, for, by 
doing nothing, he will persuade you more than he will the person to whom 
he was sent.]
Prudentia can therefore be considered both as a tool of rhetorical 
persuasion (as the use of the ablative case in ‘prudentia… persuadebit’ 
suggests) and as a defensive measure allowing one to shield oneself from 
rhetorical vis of an eloquent man. But to analyze the relationship between 
prudence and rhetoric in De vanitate consiliorum by focusing on the 
remarks of Vanitas and Veritas concerning the art of oratory would be 
a return to the interpretative approaches which I set aside at the start 
of this article. Th e question that needs to be answered is therefore not, 
“How is the relationship between rhetoric and prudence described in 
the course of the dialogue?”, but instead, “How do the remarks con-
cerning prudence relate to the rhetorical structure of De vanitate con-
siliorum?”
A two-headed council
As we have seen, the stance which Veritas takes towards internal tension 
in the Commonwealth and the diff erence of opinions from which it stems 
changes between ‘Consultationes’: from considering discord as something 
that could be put to good use by the statesman to advising Vanitas to 
quell any quarrels, if this proves necessary. In the very fi rst ‘Consultatio’, 
when Vanitas considers summoning a council, Veritas argues that the dis-
agreements between the diff erent members would prevent reaching the 
consensus needed to take political action. Her comment begins with an 
exclamation,
23  Th is remark seems similar to the inscription in Titian’s Allegory of Prudence.
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O, quam anceps illud erit! (I, 6)
[How uncertain it [the council] will be!] 
Th roughout De vanitate consiliorum, diff erent shades of uncertainty 
are described almost exclusively by the use of dubium (18 instances) and 
incertum (11 instances) or their derivatives. Anceps, however, appears only 
three times in the dialogue: when contradictions between diff erent opin-
ions are described (I, 6); when the uncertainty of relying on the experience 
of others instead of one’s own is discussed (XV, 4); and when the potential 
risk of starving the army by invading a country which is either too small or 
too vast to feed the troops is considered (XVIII, 4).
Th e fi gurative meaning of the Latin adjective anceps is, of course, 
synonymous with dubium and incertum; however, its literal meaning is 
more interesting in relationship to the passage from the fi rst ‘Consulta-
tio’ just cited. An anceps consilium is, literally, a ‘two-headed council’: one 
that could perhaps be represented by an image not very diff erent from the 
“two-headed prudentia” mentioned above.24 Th is image, I believe, would 
be a perfect frontispiece for De vanitate consiliorum, in which two char-
acters with names which are quite similar in form, but very diff erent in 
meaning, constantly put forward propositions to each other by means of 
rhetorical controversia, but never manage to achieve a consensus.
Th e debate between Vanitas and Veritas is not governed by the prin-
ciples of question-and-answer. Each time Vanitas is considering a certain 
course of action, Veritas points out diffi  culties which her interlocutor has 
overlooked and often introduces further controversial matters. Ironically, 
it is not Veritas’ task to speak the truth, but instead to turn every single 
issue into a debatable one; her role is not to assert, but constantly to raise 
new questions.
Let us consider, for example, this passage from the sixteenth ‘Consul-
tatio’, in which the issue of taxation is debated,
II. VAN. Inveniam tamen modum Contribuendi.
VER. Prius quaerendum est, quomodo quaeras, quam quomodo invenias: Tu 
autem prius invenisti necessitatem, quam modum; melius est quaerere mo-
dos, antequam opus sit, quam non posse habere, cum opus fuerit. Ut scias 
24  See n. 16 above.
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genera contributionum, scire te oportet prius genera populi, quale praevaleat 
lucro, quale numero? Observa, quid tibi prosint urbani, quid mercatores, quid 
agrestes, quid extranei, quid domestici, quid merces ab extra, quid ab intus 
provenientes; quid invectores, quid evectores, quid ab hominibus exigas, quid 
a rebus; quid ab otiosis, quid a laboriosis: quos liberare utilius tibi est, quam 
aggravare; quorum luxus tibi sit profi cuus, quorum utiles propinationes, et 
quot guttae, tot nummi. Haec prius videnda tibi erant, et ratione praevidenda, 
quam necessitas praeveniret cogitationes tuas: quia exactius providetur et tu-
tius, dum exigit providentia, quam cum necessitas. (XVI, 2)
[VAN: Nevertheless, I will fi nd a method of taxation.
VER: In the fi rst place, we should ask how to look for it rather than how to 
fi nd it. You, however, have found the need before the method; it is better to 
look for methods before the need arises than not to have them when it does 
arise. In order to know the types of taxation, you fi rst need to know the types 
of people: which of them earn the most? Which are greatest in number? Ob-
serve what the townspeople will bring you, what the merchants, what the peas-
ants, what the foreigners, what your own countrymen. What will those who 
import goods give, what those who export them? What should you demand 
from the people, what for the goods themselves? What from the unemployed, 
what from those in work? Whom is it more useful for you to exempt from pay-
ing than to make pay more? Whose luxury is of benefi t to you, whose drinking 
is useful (for every drop, there is a coin). Th ese are the things which you should 
consider and foresee in your mind before necessity outstrips your thoughts. 
For we are more exactly and securely farsighted when it is foresight rather than 
necessity which makes the demand.] 
While Veritas’ advice may seem sound, the diligence with which every 
issue is divided into further issues is almost ludicrous. Th e abundance of 
possibilities raised by each issue is brought out by the use of rhetorical 
fi gures based on repetition (anaphora: quid … quid… quid…; and ho-
moioteleuton: extranei … domestici; Mercatores … agrestes … merces … 
provenientes … invectores …evectores), while the contrast between subse-
quent elements is accentuated by the use of antiphrasis: extranei … domes-
tici; hominibus … rebus; invectores … evectores. No advice concerning the 
right course of action is provided – except the advice to deliberate further 
on the issues that have been raised and, by doing so, exercise foresight 
(providentia) or, perhaps we should say, prudence.
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While reading passages like the one quoted above, we cannot but won-
der about Lubomirski’s purpose in producing a work which goes to such 
great lengths to multiply apparent or real contradictions, to undermine or 
overturn its own previous statements, and to put each issue through the 
ringer of rhetorical controversiae and paradoxes. In my view, to consider 
this elaborate procedure as merely the expression of an aged politician’s 
disillusionment would be as naïve as trying to identify any kind of positive 
political program in Veritas’ remarks. It is much more fi tting, I believe, to 
describe De vanitate consiliorum as a rhetorical exercise in prudence.
Reading the arguments between Vanitas and Veritas entails constantly 
discerning and deliberating about a number of political issues. Th e aim is 
not to learn the correct answers to questions concerning the statesman’s 
duties, nor even to learn what the “right” questions are, but instead to 
practice the activity of deliberating about those issues. As Victoria Kahn 
has demonstrated, the deliberative rhetoric of early modern works on pru-
dence aims at engaging the reader in the activity of discrimination and, by 
doing so, training the faculty of practical reason,25 that is, the Ciceronian 
virtue of prudentia.
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